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Abstract 
This paper is an attempt to identify the major causes for calls to improve corporate governance whether at the 
firm level or at the country level. The last three decades has witnessed exponential increase in corporate 
governance awareness, corporate governance regulations and a drive for improved corporate governance. Based 
on the review of the relevant literature five reasons has been identified as the major causes for calls to improve 
corporate governance. These causes are a) increase in firm size and complexity, b) separation of ownership and 
management, c) exponential growth of capital markets, d) increase in fraud cases and financial crises and, e) 
increased awareness of corporate governance impact on firm financial performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance has come to the forefront of knowledge as a distinct and expanding field of study (Parker, 
2014) and gained momentum as a result of the infamous corporate fraud cases that occurred during the last three 
decades, such as the case of Enron and World Com in the USA. In addition, the recent financial crises in 2008 
have further emphasized the impact of poor corporate governance on firms’ performance and the repercussion of 
that on countries’ economic growth as well. The last three decades has witnessed exponential increase in 
corporate governance awareness, corporate governance regulation and a drive for improved corporate 
governance. Five reasons have been identified as the major causes for calls to improve corporate governance. 
This paper is organized in four sections, following this introduction, is section two which reviews and evaluates 
critically the debate on the definition for corporate governance, followed by section three which identifies and 
discusses the major causes for calls for improved corporate governance and the final section is section four 
which concludes summarizes and gives recommendations for future research. 
 
2. Definition of Corporate Governance  
The extant literature revealed that there is no agreement among researchers and organizations on a single 
definition for Corporate Governance, definitions differ based on the perspectives and the varying outlooks and 
exposure of researchers Armstrong and Sweeney (2002). Some definitions have been criticized as being too 
narrow while others have been criticized as broad (Ntim, 2009). A definition is classified as broad if it focuses on 
all stakeholders’ protection without defining who these stake holders are, and it is classified as narrow if it 
focuses on shareholders’ interest maximization while disregarding or ignoring other stakeholders’ interests.  
The most widely used definition is the Cadbury Report definition, where it defines corporate 
governance as how companies are managed and controlled(Arifin et al., 2014; Cadbury et al., 1992). This 
definition highlights the need for good management and good control without getting into the dilemma of being 
pro maximization of shareholders’ interests or pro protection of stakeholders. 
In (2001) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defined corporate 
governance as a system governing the relationship between executive management and shareholders. This 
definition seems very broad.  In 2010 the Organization OECD offered a more comprehensive definition that 
defines Corporate Governance “as a set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way a 
corporation is directed, administered or controlled”. Both OECD definitions focus on managing and controlling 
the relationship between corporate managers and equity owners in order to mitigate the negative impact of the 
agency conflict. 
According to (Velnampy, 2013) corporate governance is concerned with ways in which all stakeholders 
implement mechanisms to protect their interests. Velnampy definition is considered too broad because of the 
infinite number of stakeholders involved. According to (Rezaee, 2008) corporate governance can be defined as 
“a process through which shareholders induce management to act in their interest, providing a degree of 
confidence that is necessary for capital markets to function effectively”. Rezaee (2008) definition heavily draws 
from agency theory and emphasizes on the need to induce management, probably to arrive at some goal 
congruence where executive management’s interests are aligned to the interests of shareholders. 
In March 2003 the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council published 
corporate governance guidance for Australia where Corporate Governance is defined as “the system by which 
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companies are directed and managed and the risk is controlled". This definition is most comprehensive since it 
includes the risk involved as part of the definition of corporate governance. 
In light of the above it can be concluded that there is significant disagreement among researchers and 
institutions concerning the definition of corporate governance; such diversity is caused by the ever expanding 
scope of the subject of Corporate Governance itself and on whether executive management is responsible to 
maximizing owners’ equity or to also protect and maximize the interest of other stakeholders’, including 
employees, community, banks, etc., Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) argue that companies’ objective is 
maximization of owners’ wealth whereas Donaldson et al. (1983) and Freeman and McVea (2001) argue that 
firms are responsible to all stakeholders not only to their shareholders. Mc Vea’s argument highlights the need to 
realign companies’ objectives to those of shareholders in order to strike a balance between shareholders’ wealth 
maximization and their responsibility to other stakeholders. Accordingly to this argument the definition for 
corporate governance should incorporate both shareholders’ wealth maximization and the firm responsibility to 
other stakeholders. However for the researchers view corporate governance as a set of mechanisms imposed by 
regulators, companies’ boards and shareholders so that the negative impact of agency conflict can be mitigated. 
 
3. The Causes for calls for Improved Corporate Governance 
The first two decades of the third millennia are witnessing exponential increase in corporate governance 
awareness, corporate governance regulations and a drive for improved corporate governance(Black et al., 2014; 
Fox, 2014). Five reasons can be identified as the major causes for calls to improve corporate governance. Figure 
1 provides a summary of the major causes for calls for improved governance. 
Figure 1: The Major Causes for calls to improve corporate governance 
 
 
3.1 Increase in firm size and complexity 
Business entities are becoming more global and more complex due to the increase of the size and number of 
multinational firms. Firms become more complex (Poschke, 2014) because they work in different cultures, 
exposed to more risks and operated by professional management teams who are not owners. These changing and 
evolving conditions have created the need for improved corporate governance in order to protect firm owners 
and other stakeholders from abuse by professional management. Increase in firm complexity due to extensive 
spatial and or line of business diversification limits transparency hence it increases the demand for corporate 
governance (Bushman et al., 2004). 
 
3.2 Separation of ownership and management 
Separation of ownership and management is considered a major driver for improving corporate governance due 
to the impact of principal agency conflict. According to (Berle and Means, 1932) separating ownership from 
control creates incongruence between the goals of managers and that of owners, therefore sometimes managers 
do divert from corporate goals in order to achieve their own personal goals. 
 
3.3 Growth of capital markets 
The unparalleled growth of capital markets in developed, developing and emerging markets is also another 
driver for improved corporate governance regulations. Capital market growth need to be coupled by stringent, 
governance framework that guarantee competency of boards and boards accountability in order to mitigate the 
impact of agency theory and to avoid capital market collapse. Capital markets crashes that happened in 2008 due 
to corporate governance failure caused the whole world economy to collapse and lead to worldwide economic 
crises. The financial crisis that hit the South East Asian countries economies in 1997 was partially due to 
inefficient governance systems, including poor reporting practice (Becht et al., 2003, 2011; Furman et al., 1998) 
 
3.4 Increase fraud and bankruptcy cases 
Fraud and loose governance is considered number cause for financial (Jelal and Mbohwa, 2014). Regulations 
such as Sarbanes Oxley  (2002) in the USA and the recommendations of the Cadbury committee in the United 
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Kingdom (UK) which both call for more stringent corporate governance regulations are the direct result of 
reactions to corporate fraud cases. 
 
3.5 Increase awareness of corporate governance impact on firms’ performance 
The increase in awareness of corporate governance impact on firms’ performance is also considered one of the 
major Drivers for improved corporate governance. O'Regan and Oster (2005) argue that poor corporate 
performance and stakeholders’ dissatisfaction are direct result of poor corporate governance. “Good governance 
is now accepted as vital to achieving the United Nations Millennium Development Goals and as a pre-requisite 
for sustainable economic growth”(Oman and Blume, 2005) 
 
4. Conclusion and recommendation for further research 
Awareness campaigns lead by the Organization for Economic Development OECD, other regulatory bodies and 
governments in 1990s have resulted in the introduction and adoption of the OECD principles(Governance, 2004) 
for corporate governance by both developed, developing and emerging markets and the introduction of corporate 
governance codes. 
This paper based on the review of the extant literature has identified five major reasons the researchers 
believe to be the major causes for the increased attention given to improved corporate governance, by 
international organizations, by governments, by financial institutions and by academic researchers. 
The researchers recommend that future research examine the impact of these causes on corporate 
governance development at both firm level and country level. 
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